Am I Blue? Depressed Mood and the Consequences of Self Focus for the Interpretation and Recall of Ambiguous Words by Hertel, Paula T & El-Messidi, L.
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Psychology Faculty Research Psychology Department 
2006 
Am I Blue? Depressed Mood and the Consequences of Self Focus 
for the Interpretation and Recall of Ambiguous Words 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University, phertel@trinity.edu 
L. El-Messidi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/psych_faculty 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Publication Details 
Behavior Therapy 
Repository Citation 
Hertel, P.T., & El-Messidi, L. (2006). Am I blue? Depressed mood and the consequences of self focus for 
the interpretation and recall of ambiguous words. Behavior Therapy, 37(3), 259-268. doi: 10.1016/
j.beth.2006.01.003 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at Digital Commons @ 
Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
_," 
·:;� ScienceDirect Behavior Therapy 
ELSEVIER Behavior Therapy 37 (2006) 259-268 
www.elsevier.com/loca re/br 
Am I Blue? Depressed Mood and the Consequences of Self-Focus 
for the Interpretation and Recall of Ambiguous Words 
Paula T. Hertel, Lyla EI-Messidi 
Trinity University 
In two experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric students 
first concentrated on either self-focused or other-focused 
phrases and then performed an ostensibly unrelated task 
involving the interpretation of homographs with both 
personal and impersonal meanings. In Experiment 1, they 
constructed sentences for the homographs; dysphoric 
students' sentences were more emotionally negative (al­
though not more personal) in the self-focused condition than 
in the other-focused condition. In Experiment 2, they freely 
associated to the homographs, and the percentage of 
personal meanings reflected by the associations revealed 
an effect of self versus other focus that depended on mood 
group. Following free associations, they attempted to recall 
the homographs. Dysphoric students (but not nondysphoric 
students) recalled a greater percentage of personally inter­
preted homographs if they had focused on self than if they 
had focused on other matters. In general, these results 
suggest that ruminative or self-focused thinking by people in 
depressed moods transfers to novel ambiguous situations, 
encouraging more negative interpretations and better recall 
of personal interpretations. 
A MBIGUOUS MEANING in everyday situations 
surely is often not recognized as such. Cognitive 
habits, established by recent or frequent experi­
ence, save us from conscious decisions about 
meaning. Along emotional dimensions, habits of 
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positive thinking may cause us to respond optimis­
tically, whereas negative habits may cause us to be 
more skeptical. And for many people in depressed 
or dysphoric moods states, a special category of 
negative habits-rumination-may establish ten­
dencies to interpret ambiguous events as personally 
relevant. As intuitively appealing as the last claim 
might be, however, we have not found relevant 
evidence in the literature, so we report two 
experiments that make a start in this direction. 
Our main goal was to demonstrate that the habit of 
focusing on oneself establishes personal responses 
to potentially impersonal situations. 
As a method of instantiating a ruminative habit, 
we chose the manipulation created by Nolen­
Hoeksema and her colleagues (e.g., Nolen-Hoek­
sema & Morrow, 1993). Experimental participants 
concentrate on a series of phrases and explore their 
meaning, slowly and deliberately, for about 8 min. 
Although the originators referred to these tasks as 
"rumination" and "distraction," they can be seen 
as thought-induction tasks, because the phrases are 
either self-focused ("my character and who I strive 
to be") or other-focused ("the smile on the face of 
the Mona Lisa" and other perceptual images). By 
invoking ruminative habits in the experimental 
setting, the self-focused induction should establish 
a bias that transfers to the interpretation of 
subsequent ambiguous events, whereas the other­
focused induction (distraction) should discourage 
such transfer. This prediction is guided by a 
transfer-appropriate processing framework (Mor­
ris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). In the domain of 
memory research, the effects of a particular 
manipulation at Time 1 on performance at Time 
2 are stronger when the tasks on both occasions 
evoke similar cognitive processes, in comparison 
to dissimilar or mismatched processes. When 
words are studied in terms of what they mean 
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instead of what they sound like, for example, they 
are better recalled in response to meaning-related 
cues on a test of explicit memory or more often 
produced as associations to meaning-related cues 
on a test of implicit memory; however, the reverse 
is true when the test cues are phonologically 
related to the word (see Blaxton, 1989). Processes 
that are similar across two occasions are deemed 
transfer-appropriate. 
According to a transfer-appropriate processing 
framework and similar notions about contextual 
specificity, the point of view established by a 
thought-induction task should transfer to a subse­
quent interpretation task to the extent that both 
tasks vary along the same dimension. Clearly a 
primary dimension in the thought-induction task is 
the extent of personal meaning inherent in the 
phrases. So we developed a set of homographs, each 
with both personal and impersonal meanings (e.g., 
close, console, express, loaf, kind, reflect, well), to 
use in the interpretation task. Following a self­
focused or other-focused induction, participants 
performed tasks on these homographs that allowed 
us to determine the nature of their interpretations. 
In Experiment 1, they created sentences, and in 
Experiment 2, they freely associated. We hypothe­
sized that, compared to participants who focused 
on other matters in the thought-induction task, 
those who focused on the self would express 
personal interpretations of the homographs more 
frequently, particularly if they were dysphoric. The 
self-focused task should activate self-focused habits, 
presumably more prevalent in the thinking of 
depressed or dysphoric people (see Mor & Win­
quist, 2002; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; 
Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998). 
In Experiment 2, we followed the free-associa­
tion task with a test of free recall of the 
homographs to which they associated. The recall 
test served as a second measure of focus on the 
meaning of the homographs. The more meaning­
fully processed homographs should be better 
recalled (see Craik & Tulving, 1975), and we 
expected that personally interpreted homographs 
would be more meaningful to, and therefore 
better recalled by, dysphoric participants who 
had focused on the self. 
A somewhat different question to be addressed in 
this paradigm is whether the habit of self-focus, as 
called forth by the thought-induction task, influ­
ences the emotional valence of interpretations in 
dysphoria. For depressed or dysphoric participants, 
the thought-induction task often has consequences 
similar to a mood-induction task; the self-focused 
condition makes them feel more depressed, and the 
other-focused condition makes them feel less 
depressed (e.g., Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen­
Hoeksema, 1998). Moreover, Lyubomirsky et a!. 
discovered cognitive consequences of the self­
focused induction for the production of negative 
autobiographical memories. In keeping with those 
findings, as well as the underlying notion that 
dysphoric participants' thoughts should be more 
emotionally negative during the self-focused induc­
tion, we hypothesized that dysphoric participants in 
the self-focused condition would produce more 
emotionally negative sentences, compared to those 
who had recently focused elsewhere. Increased 
negativity in the self-focused condition might reflect 
mood-congruent processing (if there is evidence for 
differential negativity in mood), thought-congruent 
processmg (the transfer of cognitive habits), or 
both. 
Experiment I 
In the first experiment, dysphoric and nondy­
sphoric students underwent a thought-induction 
procedure in which they concentrated on a series of 
phrases that were either self-focused or other­
focused for approximately 8 min (see Nolen­
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Subsequently, on 
each of 40 trials of the interpretation task an 
interpretation cue was presented, and they were 
asked to use this word in a sentence; 60% of 
these words were homographs with both personal 
and impersonal meanings, and the others were 
fillers with one primary meaning. We first 
predicted that self-focused thinking would cause 
participants, particularly dysphoric participants, 
to construct more sentences reflecting personal 
meanings of the homographs. Our second predic­
tion was that more negatively emotional sentences 
would be created by the dysphoric participants 
who self-focused. 
The interpretation trials were actually designed 
to be analogs for the experience of being 
reminded of one's previous thoughts while 
performing a new task. On 60% of the trials, 
prior to the presentation of the interpretation cue, 
either a new word or a trigger word from the 
induction procedure appeared at the top of the 
screen. Participants were asked to indicate whether 
this top word-the potential reminder-had oc­
curred during the previous induction task. (The 
triggers were common to both induction condi­
tions.) We did not entertain a specific prediction 
regarding the trigger trials, because being occasion­
ally reminded of self-focused thoughts might be 
sufficient to exert the effect across all trials. 
Regardless, the outcome of this manipulation was 
uninformative, and therefore we omit most of the 
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associated details from the description of materials 
(in the interest of mental and physical economy). 
Method 
PART ICIPANTS AND DESIGN 
Undergraduate students were given the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
& Emery, 1979) during their introductory psy­
chology course to assess their levels of dysphoric 
mood. Those who scored lower than 6 and higher 
than 9 were recruited for participation, and the 
experimenters who interacted with the partici­
pants were unaware of their BDI scores. (The 
scores of 6 through 9 were avoided in order to 
decrease attrition due to changes during the 1-to-
2-week period between the class administration 
and the experimental session. Only 10% of the 
recruited dysphoric participants' scores fell below 
12, which is akin to a score of 14 on the BDI-II­
the cutoff for mild depression; Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996.) 
Under a constraint of equal cell sizes and 
approximately equal gender distributions, partici­
pants were randomly assigned to conditions of the 
thought-induction task. Those whose end-of-ses­
sion BDI scores placed them out of the original 
categories of dysphoric or nondysphoric were 
replaced (7 from the dysphoric group and 4 from 
the nondysphoric group). The final sample in the 
self-focused condition included 18 dysphoric and 
18 nondysphoric participants, 10 of whom were 
female and 8 male. The other-focused condition 
contained 18 participants from each mood catego­
ry, 9 of each gender. This final sample of 72 
participants excluded the data of 5 additional 
participants who failed to comply with instructions 
for the sentence-production task. 
MATER IALS 
Mood forms. In the initial mood form of the 
session, participants were asked to rate the extent to 
which their feelings "at this moment" corresponded 
to each of several adjectives (e.g., dreamy, sad, 
angry, elated, curious, depressed) by using a scale of 
1 (not at all) to 9 (very) (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). 
The second mood form, given after the induction 
phase, consisted of some of the same adjectives, 
plus additional ones, but in a different order than 
on the previous form. The participants' ratings for 
the adjectives sad and depressed were totaled 
separately for each form to constitute their two 
mood scores. 
Thought-induction phrases. Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow's (1993) rumination and distraction 
phrases were slightly modified to produce 50 
phrases in each category (self-focused vs. other­
focused, respectively) and displayed one per page 
in a booklet. Eight phrases in each set were 
constructed to contain identical "trigger" homo­
graphs to be used during the interpretation phase 
(Brozovich, 2003). For example, participants in the 
self-focused condition read, "your character and 
who you strive to be" (an original phrase from 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow) whereas those in the 
other-focused group read, "a character on a 
computer keyboard" (a new phrase of our 
invention). 
Interpretation cues. Interpretation cues con­
sisted of 24 target homographs (not used in the 
induction phase) and 16 fillers. The target 
homographs were chosen from Twilley, Dixon, 
Taylor, and Clark (1994), based on whether at 
least one of their meanings was personal and 
another impersonal (bitter, blunt, bug, close, 
console, deep, desert, down, dump, express, felt, 
firm, hound, kind, loaf, reflect, relish, sharp, shed, 
stable, strain, trip, vent, well). Those with 
extreme differences in interpretation frequencies 
were avoided (for those chosen, M = .30 for 
personal meaning and .65 for impersonal mean­
ing). In order to disguise the nature of the 
experiment, 16 filler words with one primary 
meaning were selected from Kucera and Francis 
(1967) and approximately matched with the 
homographs on word frequencies. One random­
ized-block order of interpretation cues was used 
for all participants. Each block contained three 
homographs and two fillers, randomly assigned, 
for a total of 40 trials. 
PRO CEDURE 
The session was described as a collection of 
independent tasks and questionnaires. First, parti­
cipants were asked to fill out the initial mood form 
and place it in an envelope to be delivered later to 
the supervising faculty member. Then the thought­
induction task was described as a pilot for a later 
study that would examine the factors that facilitate 
concentration, with the implication that questions 
would follow. The participants received their 
assigned booklets (either self-focused or other­
focused) and were asked to read and concentrate 
on each phrase in turn for 10 s. They were instructed 
not to turn the page until the tape-recorded beep 
sounded. When they completed this task, they were 
given the second mood form to complete and place 
in the envelope with the first form. 
Next, we described the purpose of the interpre­
tation task as an investigation of sentence con­
struction, under conditions in which another, 
alternating task is also being performed 
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(recognition). All words were presented in bold 
black font on a white screen, programmed in 
Superlab Pro. We told participants that, because of 
this alternating task, on most of the trials a word 
would appear at the top of the screen. If a word 
appeared at the top (24 of the 40 trials), 3 s were 
allotted for the decision of whether the word was 
old (from the previous booklet) or new. Partici­
pants pressed "v" on the keyboard (relabeled as 
"o") for judgments of old and "n" for judgments 
of new. In the event that no word appeared at the 
top, participants were told to wait for the word at 
the bottom of the screen to appear (in 3 s). On 
every trial, an interpretation cue (homograph or 
filler) appeared at the bottom for 3 s. Participants 
were instructed to repeat this word aloud and then 
use it in a sentence. They were asked not to 
produce very elaborate sentences, but also not to 
use uninformative sentences (e.g., It is a bug). After 
saying each sentence, they pressed a space bar, and 
a +sign at the top of the screen indicated entry into 
the next trial. The spoken responses were recorded 
on tape and coded later. Participants were given 
four practice trials to ensure their understanding of 
the procedure before beginning the actual trials, at 
which point the experimenter left the room. 
At the end of the session, prior to ·debriefing, 
participants filled out a second BDI, used to check 
whether they still belonged in the same mood 
category. They placed it in the envelope that 
contained the two mood forms and sealed it. 
CODING 
Taped responses to homographs during the inter­
pretation phase were transcribed verbatim. Two 
raters independently coded all transcribed 
responses categorically, according to whether the 
sentence: (a) reflected personal or impersonal 
meaning (98% agreement, K = .95) and (b) 
expressed positive, neutral, or negative emotion 
(77% agreement).1 All disagreements were resolved 
by discussion without reference to condition. 
Results and Discussion 
MOOD SCORES 
To examine effects of the thought-induction proce­
dure on temporary mood, a mixed design ANOVA 
was performed with a within-subjects factor for the 
1 We could not compure estimates of K for the valence 
judgments, because the actual judgments involved in disagreements 
between raters were inadverrenrly discarded. When the judgments 
are conceptualized as negative versus nonnegative, agreement was 
96%. The clear majority of disagreements thus concerned the 
difference between neutral and positive sentences. 
timing of the form {pre- vs. post-induction) and 
between-subjects factors for mood group (nondy­
sphoric vs. dysphoric) and thought induction 
condition (self-focused vs. other-focused). The 
main effect for mood group was significant, f(l, 
68) = 37.60, MSE = 20.48, p < .001. Means are 
reported in Table 1. The only other significant effect 
was the three-way interaction of group by induction 
by timing, F(l, 68) = 4.35, MSE = 2.68, p = .041. 
The simple interaction of timing and induction was 
nonsignificant for nondysphoric participants 
(p = .231) and only marginally significant for 
dysphoric participants, f (1 ,  34) = 3.14, 
MSE = 2.34, p = .085. As seen in Table 1, the 
pattern of means is in line with the typical finding 
that the self-focused induction impairs mood in 
dysphoria and the other-focused induction 
improves mood; however, the other-focused group 
started out with higher scores on the pretest. 
Clearly, the moods of the self-focused dysphoric 
participants at post-induction were no more nega­
tive than the relevant comparison scores. 
PER CEN TAGE OF HOMOGRAPHS 
INTERPRETED PERSONALLY 
The primary dependent variable used to evaluate 
the consequences of self-focused attention was the 
percentage of homographs interpreted personally, 
instead of impersonally, according to the meaning 
expressed in the participants' sentences. This 
measure was submitted to a mixed design 
ANOYA, with between-subjects factors for mood 
group and induction procedure and a within­
subjects factor for type of trial. Type of trial refers 
to whether triggers, new words, or nothing 
appeared at the top of the screen prior to the 
interpretation cue appearing at the bottom. All 
effects in this design were nonsignificant, p > .10. 
As is clear in the pattern of means presented in 
Table 1, our hypothesis concerning transfer effects 
of the thought induction procedure, alone or 
interacting with mood group, received no support, 
Fs < 1.0. 
Dysphoric participants' personal interpretations 
of the homographs were more frequent than the 
normative f requency: (. 30),  t (35) = 4.20, 
SE = 2.290, p < .001. However, the same can be 
said of the nondysphoric participants: t (35) = 2.53, 
SE = 1.975, p = .016. 
As an aside before turning away from this 
measure, we report a correlation between the 
percentage of homographs interpreted personally 
and scores on the Rumination on Sadness Scale 
(Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000), which 
had also been administered in the introductory 
psychology classes and coded for this purpose. The 
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Table 1 
Means (Standard Deviations) in Experiment 1 
Nondysphoric Dysphoric 
Self-focused Other-focused Self-focused Other-focused 
5.6 (3.2) 
5.6 (3.2) 
3.4 (1.8) 
4.0 (1.8) 
5.0 (2.4) 
2.2 (1.2) 
9.3 (4.1) 10.4 (3.5) 
9.6 (4.1) 9.4 (4.3) 
16.2 (6.4) 17.0 (6.5) 
Pre-induction 
Post-induction 
Session BDI scores 
Percentage personal 35.3 (11.4) 34.7 (12.6) 40.2 (13.2) 39.0 (13.6) 
Note. n = 18. "Percentage personal" refers to the percentage of homographs that were interpreted personally. 
correla tion was modest but significant, r (70) = .26, 
p = .029, and indicates that participants who 
reportedly ruminate when they are sad tended to 
interpret homographs personally. 
PERCENTAGE OF SENTENCES WITH 
NEGATI V E  EMOTIONAL MEANING 
The percentage of sentences that were judged to be 
emotionally negative served as the next dependent 
variable in an ANOVA, with between-subjects 
factors for mood group and induction procedure. 
The main effect of induction procedure was 
significant, F (1, 68) = 6.22, MSE = 129.9, 
p = .015. Although this effect did not depend on 
mood group (F < 1.0), our hypothesis pertained to 
dysphoric participants in particular, and therefore 
we performed a priori tests of the effect within 
each mood group. Clearly, self-focused thoughts 
made interpretations more negative in the dys­
phoric group, t (34) = 2.29, SE = 3.963, p = .028. 
As shown in Figure 1, 39% of interpretations in 
the self-focused condition were negative 
(SD = 12.78), on average, compared to 30% in 
the other-focused condition (SD = 10.92). The 
corresponding mean percentages in the nondy­
sphoric group were 36 and 32 (SDs = 12.22 
and 9.35)-a difference that was not significant, 
t (34) = 1.19, SE = 3.627, p = .243.2 Overall, 
the percentage of negative interpretations was 
significantly correlated with the percentage of 
personal interpretations, r (70) = .31, p = .009. 
Experiment 2 
In a second attempt to examine potential transfer 
effects of cognitive habits, Experiment 2 was 
conducted without reminders about the induction 
task. With hindsight, we were concerned that 
2 ANOVA on the percentage of neutral interpretations revealed 
only a marginally significant main effect of induction, F("l, 
64) = 3.12, MSE = 210.52, p < .10. The percentage was higher 
in the other-focused condition, but neither simple main effect 
within each mood group approached significance, p > .15. A 
similar analysis performed on the percentage of positive inrerpreta­
tions revealed no significant effects, Fs < 1.0. 
reminders might even interfere by establishing too 
analytic a set for the transfer of a self-focused 
perspective. At least one nondysphoric participant 
(whose data were set aside) had created several 
sentences containing both meanings of the homo­
graphs. Also following that line of reasoning, we 
changed the interpretation task to one that fosters a 
less analytic set: free association. (Because we 
requested one-word responses, the valence of the 
association was heavily constrained by the valence 
of the homograph itself, and so the hypothesis 
about emotional valence could not be adequately 
separated from the hypothesis about personal 
meaning.) 
Finally, a new procedure was included in Exper­
iment 2. Following the interpretation task, we 
surprised the participants with a request to recall 
the cues for free association. Perhaps even more 
important than the degree of personal meaning 
initially taken from an ambiguous event is the degree 
to which that personal interpretation is subsequently 
remembered. The prediction for this task was that 
dysphoric students in particular should recall more 
of the homographs that they had interpreted 
45 
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40 
35 
GJ 30 .:: 
ftj g' 25 
z 
'if- 20 
c: 15 m GJ 
:E 10 
5 
0 
Nondysphoric Dysphoric 
Mood Group 
FIGURE I Mean percentages of sentences judged to be 
negatively emotional in each mood group and condition of the 
thought-induction task (Experiment I). Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
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personally if their self-focusing habits had been 
activated by the induction procedure. Such an 
outcome would reflect a stronger focus on personal 
meaning in the interpretations. 
Method 
PARTICIPANTS AN D DESIGN 
Using the same selection procedure and criteria as 
in Experiment 1, we randomly assigned dysphoric 
and nondysphoric participants to the self-focused 
and other-focused thought-induction task, with the 
constraint of equal cell sizes. After the data from 
participants who changed their mood conditions 
were set aside (n = 6 in each mood group), 8 female 
and 8 male students participated in each combina­
tion of mood group and induction task, for a total 
of 64 participants. 
MATERIALS AN D PROCEDURE 
All materials and procedures were identical to 
those in Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. In the interpretation task, 12 fillers 
and 12 homographs (bitter, blue, console, deep, 
dump, express, glare, odd, stable, tear, vent, and 
well) were arranged in a randomized block order, 
with each block containing two fillers and two 
homographs. (With the omission of the remin­
ders, the design required fewer homographs; 
fewer were also preferred on the basis of reduced 
awareness of their homographic quality.) The 
words were presented for 2 s each, followed by a 
blank screen. Participants were instructed to read 
each word aloud and then to blurt out the first 
two words that came to mind. Although we 
planned to evaluate the meaning of the first word 
only, we requested two words to reduce any 
tendency to choose a "best" response. After 
producing two responses, participants advanced 
the program to the next trial. All responses were 
taped, with the experimenter absent from the 
room. 
Another change from Experiment 1 was the 
inclusion of three filler tasks at the very beginning 
Table 2 
Means (Standard Deviations) in Experiment 2 
Non dysphoric 
of the session, in order to make a more convincing 
case for the session consisting of a collection of 
unrelated tasks. These tasks included 2 min of 
spatial problem-solving, 5 min of finding hidden 
objects in pictures, and a bogus test of color 
preferences. They were followed by the first mood 
form, the thought-induction task, the second mood 
form, and the free-association test. (Participants 
were told that their associations would guide 
choices for later experiments.) Then, participants 
were handed a sheet of blank paper and asked to 
recall the cues for association-the words presented 
on the screen during the previous task. Unlimited 
time was allowed. The final procedure was the 
administration of the BDl. 
The first responses to homographs during the 
free-association task were transcribed from the tape 
and independently coded by two raters for the 
extent to which they reflected personal or imper­
sonal meaning. The raters agreed about 96% of the 
responses (K = .92) and resolved their disagree­
ments without reference to condition. 
Results and Discussion 
MOOD SCORES 
As in Experiment 1, the ratings on the "sad" and 
"depressed" scales were summed for each mood 
form, although three participants (1 dysphoric and 
2 nondysphoric) were missing rating data, having 
failed to turn over the pages. These scores were 
submitted to a mixed design ANOVA, with 
between-subjects factors for mood group and 
induction task and a within-subjects factor for 
timing (pre- and post-induction). Dysphoric stu­
dents produced higher scores, regardless of timing 
or induction, f(1, 57) = 47.33, MSE = 16.16, 
p < .001. Means are presented in Table 2. The only 
other significant effect was the interaction of mood 
group and timing, F(l, 57) = 6.69, MSE = 3.55, 
p = .012. Both mood groups' scores tended to 
regress to the overall mean. Again, the dysphoric 
data did not replicate Nolen-Hoeksema and Mor­
row's (1993) results. 
Dysphoric 
Self-focused Other-focused Self-focused Other-focused 
Pre-induction 
Post-induction 
Session BDI scores 
Percentage personal 
3.4 (1.6) 
5.1 (3.0) 
2.5 (1.9) 
45.0 (22.0) 
4.9 (2.5) 
5.9 (3.5) 
2.9 (2.2) 
54.9 (16.3) 
10.0 (3.7) 10.2 (3.7) 
10.1 (3.1) 9.2 (3.4) 
13.6 (4.3) 15.8 (5.2) 
51.8 (18.4) 44.6 (19.1) 
Note. n = 16, but only 15 for mood ratings in the nondysphoric condition and in the dysphoric/self condition. "Percentage personal" refers to 
the percentage of homographs that were interpreted personally. 
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FIGURE 2 Mean percentages of personally interpreted homo­
graphs recalled in each mood group and condition of the thought­
induction task (Experiment 2). Enror bars represent standard 
errors. 
PERCENTAGE OF HOMOGRAPHS 
I NTER PRETED PERSONALLY 
Due to a programming error on one computer, one 
of the homographs was not displayed during the 
free association task for 30 participants (7 nondy­
sphoric self-focused, 8 nondysphoric other-focused, 
8 dysphoric self-focused, and 7 dysphoric other­
focused). Therefore, the dependent measure was the 
percentage of homographs interpreted personally, 
out of either 11 or 12 total. An initial analysis 
included "computer" as a factor and revealed no 
significant effects associated with the programming 
error. Therefore, this percentage was submitted to 
an ANOVA with between-subjects factors for mood 
group, induction procedure, and gender. Gender 
was included in the design as a means of reducing 
error variance; we held no expectations about the 
interaction of gender with the variables of interest. 3 
As shown in Table 2, the interaction of 
mood group with induction condition was 
significant, F (1, 56) = 4.55, MSE = 259.54, 
p = .037. Dysphoric students interpreted homo­
graphs personally more frequently following the 
self-focused induction, whereas nondysphoric stu­
dents showed the opposite pattern. However, these 
simple main effects were nonsignificant; in the 
dysphoric group, F (1, 28) = 1.75, MSE = 242.71, 
3 Gender was also initially included as a factor in the Experiment 
1 analyses and then excluded because it did not ufficiently reduce 
error variance to change any of the reponed outcomes. In 
Experiment 2, the inclusion of gender helped to increase power 
in analyses of interpretations. Female students made more personal 
free associations than did male students, F(l, 56) = 26.09, 
MSE = 259.54, p < .001. All other effects involving gender were 
nonsignificant, Fs < 1.0. 
p = .20; in the nondysphoric group, F (1, 28) = 2.83, 
MSE = 276.37, p = .10. 
PERCENTAGE OF HOMOGRAPHS RECALLED 
The percentages of personally interpreted homo­
graphs that were subsequently recalled were sub­
mitted to an ANOVA with between-subjects factors 
for mood group, induction procedure, and gender. 
The interaction of induction procedure with mood 
group was significant, F ( 1, 56) = 4.52, 
MSE = 100.48, p = .038. Illustrated in Figure 2, 
dysphoric participants assigned to self-focus 
recalled a higher percentage than did those assigned 
to focus on other matters (M = 20% vs. 11%, 
SDs = 9.34 and 9.08, respectively), F(l, 28) = 8.31, 
MSE = 73.87, p = .007. The corresponding 
difference for nondysphoric participants  
(M = 14% vs. 16%, SDs = 12.24 and 11.64, 
respectively) was nonsignificant, F < 1.0.4 (In an 
analysis of the percentage of impersonally inter­
preted homographs recalled, all effects were non­
significant, Fs < 1.0, M = 17%.) 
General Discussion 
Together, these two experiments provide some useful 
evidence concerning the cognitive consequences of 
self-focused attention for the interpretation of 
ambiguous words by dysphoric students. In Exper­
iment 1, a period of self-focus led them to construct 
more emotionally negative sentences, although not 
ones that implicated more personal interpretations of 
the homographs. In Experiment 2, self-focus tended 
to cause more personal interpretations, at least in 
contrast to the opposite pattern shown by nondy­
sphoric students. Moreover, when the dysphoric 
students were self-focused they later recalled a higher 
percentage of personally interpreted homographs. 
We address each finding in turn. 
In Experiment 1, self-focused dysphoric students 
constructed more emotionally negative sentences in 
response to the homographs than did those in the 
other-focused condition. This effect might be 
thought of as a mood-congruent effect if the self­
focused induction had actually caused dysphoric 
4 The only significant effect involving gender in the analysis of 
recall data was the three-way interaction of gender, induction, and 
mood group, F( I ,  56) = 9.54, MSE = 100.48, p = .003. Follow-up 
rests, to be interpreted cautiously because the cell sizes were small 
(11 = 8), indicated that the pattern illustrated in Figure 2 was 
exaggerated for male students and nor significant for female 
students. Again, we included the gender factor as a method of 
reducing error variance. Even without irs inclusion, however, the 
interaction of induction and mood group was significant, F(l, 
60) = 3.99, MSE = 113.74, p = .050; and so was the simple main 
effect of induction procedure within the dysphoric group, F(1, 
30) = 7.24, MSE = 84.82, p = .012. 
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parttctpants to feel sadder than if they had been 
distracted by other matters. Because it did not, it is 
probably better to think of the effect as primarily 
cognitive instead of affective. Thinking unhappy 
thoughts about self likely transferred to thinking 
negative thoughts about the homographs. Although 
the interaction of induction procedure with mood 
group was nonsignificant, the sentences created by 
nondysphoric students did not reveal a significant 
effect of thought induction. Nevertheless, the 
overall level of negativity in both mood groups 
was sizable. In that regard it is important to keep in 
mind that the valence of the sentence must have 
depended in part on the valence of the homographs' 
meanings, and clearly we chose a number of 
homographs with emotionally negative interpreta­
tions. The percentage of negative interpretations 
was significantly correlated with the percentage of 
personal interpretations. 
Turning now to the personal versus impersonal 
nature of the homographs' meanings, we conclude 
that Experiment 1 provided no support for the 
main hypothesis concerning the transfer of self­
focusing effects. The sentences constructed by 
dysphoric participants expressed the personal 
meanings of the homographs nondifferentially in 
the two induction conditions and no more 
frequently than did the sentences produced by 
nondysphoric students. If and when such transfer 
of personal focus occurs, we now surmise that it is 
likely to be automatically achieved and potentially 
disrupted by other cognitive concerns. Perhaps the 
use of reminders during the interpretation task 
interfered by encouraging participants to monitor 
their thoughts. Even the very task of creating 
sentences might itself be too "forced" to reflect the 
operation of relatively automatic habits. In side­
stepping these possibilities, we excluded reminders 
and employed a more reflexive interpretation task 
in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 2, the effect of self-focus, 
although not significant for the dysphoric partici­
pants, was in the hypothesized direction, in 
contrast to the opposite direction in the nondy­
sphoric group. The interaction was significant, but 
due in part to low variance associated with the 
main effect of induction, the interaction did not 
partition into significant simple main effects within 
either mood group. Responses were quite variable; 
therefore power was low. Among factors possibly 
responsible for low power was the small separation 
between the mood groups. In particular, the scores 
on the end-of-session BDI in the self-focused 
condition fell to low levels (M = 13.6). Obviously, 
that outcome suggests the collection of data from 
more clearly depressed individuals in the future. 
Another potentially useful procedure would be to 
recruit and assign participants according to their 
tendency to ruminate; one might thereby find 
effects of thought induction for those who typically 
ruminate and not for others. In that vein, 
Experiment 1 did reveal a modest but significant 
relationship between rumination and the tendency 
to make personal interpretations. 
In the meantime, until such research is per­
formed, we emphasize the recall data in Experiment 
2, which provide solid evidence for the transfer of 
cognitive habits along a self-referential or person­
oriented dimension. The self-focused dysphoric 
participants recalled a higher percentage of the 
homographs that they had interpreted personally, 
compared to the other-focused dysphoric partici­
pants. In short, although they did not make 
significantly more personal interpretations in the 
self-focused condition, they seemed to have made 
them at a more meaningful or attentive level that 
facilitated their subsequent recall. 
The effect on free recall provides an experimental 
model for aspects of ruminative remembering. 
When we ruminate about our experience we 
construct processing episodes that themselves are 
remembered, potentially in place of the original 
episode. So, even though reasoning from homo­
graphic free associations to real-life events is a 
stretch, it is tempting to speculate that the personal 
interpretation is the "event" that is subsequently 
recalled, particularly well under conditions of 
depressive rumination and self-focus. In the course 
of habitual cognition, recall of personal interpreta­
tions potentially returns the "favor" by exacerbat­
ing future tendencies to "take things personally." 
The two experiments described in this report are 
novel in their exploration of cognitive consequences 
of self-focused thoughts for the tendency to "take 
things personally." By using Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow's (1993) rumination and distraction pro­
cedures, previous research has explored the cogni­
tive consequences of self-focused thinking on other 
measures of cognition in depression and dysphoria. 
We mention just a few examples. Dysphoric 
students who have undergone a self-focused induc­
tion (compared to those who were other-focused) 
have been shown to experience an enhanced sense 
of insightfulness but greater pessimism about 
positive events in their future, and they have been 
found to generate fewer effective solutions to 
interpersonal problems and more negative 
responses to imagined problem situations (Lyubor­
mirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995). Evidence 
for effects on memory tasks has also been obtained 
by using thought-induction procedures. A dyspho­
ria-related disruption in the more attention-
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demanding, del iberate component of remembering 
was found fol lowing the self-focused but not the 
other-focused induction ( Hertel ,  1 99 8 ) .  A lso, mea­
sures of autobiographica l  memory have been 
a ffected by thought-induction procedures. Com­
pared to the self-focused procedure, the other­
foc used or d istracting procedure reduced the 
number of categ<:>rica l ,  overly general memories 
reca l led by dysphoric and depressed participants 
(Watkins, Teasdale, & Wil l iams, 2000), as wel l as  
the negativity of such memories (Lyubomirsky et 
a l . ,  1 99 8 ) .  
More genera l ly, the current experiments a re 
a mong the few to find experimenta l evidence of 
interpretive biases in  dysphoria and depression (see 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) .  Probably the clea rest 
evidence of interpretive bias in dysphoria was 
revealed quite indirectly. Lawson, MacLeod, and 
Hammond (2002) measured the blink reflex in 
response to noise presented during an imagery task .  
Participants i maged situations evoked by aura lly 
presented ambiguous and nonambiguous words. 
Dysphoric participants produced particularly am­
plified blink reflexes during the imaging of emo­
tional ly negative words and similarly amplified 
reflexes during the imaging of ambiguous words 
with possible negative interpretations. According to 
these results,  a s  wel l as the c urrent report, 
procedures might be more likely to reveal interpre­
tive b iases to the extent that they inv ite habitual 
processes (see Hertel, 2004 ). 
Dysphoria is a term that refers to nondiagnosed 
negative a ffect, of the sort that is measured by the 
BDl. Scores on the BDI are highly correlated with 
trait anxiety measures. Plainly, anxiety experienced 
by our dysphoric participants might be at least 
partly responsible for the pattern of results, because 
interpretive biases have frequently been demon­
strated in anxiety (e.g., Eysenck, Mogg, May, 
Richards, & Mathews, 1 99 1 ;  MacLeod & Cohen, 
1 993) .  Recently, anxiety-related interpretive biases 
have been successfu l l y  modeled in nonanxious 
groups (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  
Like our use of the thought-induction tasks, these 
experiments developed interpretive habits in an 
initial phase, which subsequently produced transfer 
effects, even on diss imilar tasks (e .g. ,  Hertel,  
Mathews, Peterson, & Kintner, 2003) and fo l low­
ing delays (Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005) .  
It  is worth considering that transfer-appropriate 
processes operating from one task to another might 
ulti mately be more important to understanding 
biases than whether the individual is primarily 
depressed or anxious, especial ly considering the 
overlap in  symptoms ( see Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) .  
Moreover, in  deciding about nonpharmacologica l 
treatment, it might be j ust a s  i mporta nt to 
understand the cognitive ha bits of individua l s  
w h o  are depressed o r  anxious as it is to find the 
right diagnostic category. 
Im plications for Clin ical Practice 
A lthough only a few studies have found evidence of 
interpreti ve b iases in depressed or dysphoric 
samples, such biases a re taken for granted by 
practicing psychotherapists. Changing the cognitive 
h a b i ts of depressed c l i ents h a s  long been a 
cornerstone of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Some 
of those practices, known as cognitive restructur­
ing, cal l  to the client's attention the m ultiple 
interpretations of ambiguous events in an effort to 
encourage impersonal interpretations (e.g.,  Is it 
possible that she didn't return your call because she 
is out of town, not because she is avoiding you ? ) .  
Clearly it is impossible to cha nge habits without 
first revea ling them. However, one drawback to a 
therapeutic focus on interpretations is the possible 
strengthening of the habit to interpret personal ly, 
particu larly when homework for cognitive restruc­
turing is difficult to get under way. Under the latter 
conditions, the transfer-appropriate processing 
approach suggests a potentia l ly useful a lternative. 
The al ternative is simply to sidestep cognitive habits 
instead of arguing with them.  Directing cl ients who 
ruminate unproductively to notice and subsequent­
ly turn their attention to unrelated but compel l ing 
topics, idea l ly agreed upon in advance, takes 
advantage of the usefu l ness of distraction in  
possibly i mproving mood (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1 993 ) and wea kening the ruminative 
cycle. Even the brute-force method of suppressing 
undesirable thoughts has been shown to decrease 
their subsequent occurrence, particularly by indivi­
duals with major depressive d isorder (e.g., Joor­
m a n n ,  Herte l ,  Brozovich,  & Gotl i b ,  2 0 0 5 ) .  
Thought substitutes a re helpfu l  in this process, a t  
least in nondiagnosed samples ( Hertel & Calca­
terra, 2005) .  Some suppressed thoughts seem to 
rebound later on their own steam (Wegner, 1 994 ), 
but clea rly much work remains  if we a re to 
understand why some seem to rebound whereas 
others can be suppressed to the point of being 
inaccessible during intentional reca l l  (Joormann et 
a l . ,  2005 ) .  
O f  course, speculations a bout therapeutic prac­
tices wander far from the data we present, but our 
investigation and these speculations both derive 
from an understanding of ruminative thinking as 
habit in a rather old-fash ioned behavioral sense. 
The way to extinguish one behavior is to practice 
doing someth ing different i nstead.  The way to stop 
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perce1vmg and remembering the ambiguous as 
personal is to do something that turns the focus of 
attention away from self. 
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